Following a brief introduction, I am providing below  the text titled: "The ‘ontology of the person’ in contemporary theology", which was the first presentation that His Eminence the late Metropolitan Germanos of Elis had assigned me to expound at the Theological Conference of his Sacred Metropolis on the 3^rd of February 2018, which was attended by Theologians and University Professors. The second presentation was titled: "The decisions of the Holy and Great Synod on the ‘ontology of the person’".

He was very interested in the subject of “person” – both according to the Patristic tradition as well as contemporary  theology, because he had heard me speak on these issues and had wished to inform the theologians of his Jurisdiction, himself having of course agreed on these issues.

I must mention that he was one of the few Hierarchs who, when various theological and ecclesiastic issues arose, would call me and ask for my opinions, which he listened to with interest and attention.  He was also interested in the theology of the Orthodox Church, which is why every year, at the beginning of February he would organize Theological Conferences on a variety of topics - for both the theologians of his Jurisdiction and more broadly - to which I had also been invited, in order to deliver an introductory speech.

The blessed Metropolitan and I were connected not only by our common approach to theological and ecclesiastic issues - with rare exceptions - but also by the fact that it was the ordination of my Predecessor (and later Metropolitan of Elis), Germanos Goumas; also by the fact that I bear the name of his uncle, the blessed Metropolitan of Aetolia and Acarnania, Hierotheos Paraskevopoulos.

It is understood that the appreciation between us was mutual and that I had a particular respect for him and his work.

The Introduction that is presented herebelow had been attended by the blessed Metropolitan with much attention. He had given the opportunity to the theologians present to speak freely; he gave me ample time to answer their queries, without any interventions by him, accepting both the introduction and the answers that were given. A rare Hierarch indeed, of the "old school" kind... and inoffensive!

After the Conference, he published the Minutes along with my two introductions, in fact at the expense of the Sacred Metropolis. He also authored a special Preface in which his charisms are clearly evident; namely, that despite his advanced age, he was still interested in theological issues and wanted to learn something new - in relation of course, to Patristic tradition and to contemporary theology.

In that Preface he wrote the following:

"If the wise Socrates had said: "I grow old, forever learning" and pedagogical science today speaks of “lifelong learning” so that everyone learns what they need in order to confront the difficulties of their lives, this is what we Orthodox Christians particularly must do, in order to learn the will of God - which protects us in our lives, but also strengthens us when we need to confront our difficulties.

This is also the purpose of the annual Theological Conference of our Metropolis. That is, it seeks to consolidate but also amplify Christian knowledge for the Clergy, the Theologians of our region and for our Christian faithful.

Thus, it has been a special blessing from God this year, to have as a speaker at our Theological Conference His Eminence Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos and Saint Vlasios – who is well known both in Greece and abroad for his extensive theological instruction.

For this reason, and from this position, I especially thank him for his effort to come here to us for two days, to bless us and to let us listen to his theological word. However, I would also like to thank him warmly for sending us the essays of his speeches for publication, so that those who did not have the opportunity to attend and listen to him during the days of our Conference may also gain knowledge of them and be taught. These texts are contained in the present Tome. It is my belief that we will all benefit from reading them. I pray so, with all my soul.

Pyrgos March 18, 2018

Fourth Sunday of Lent - Feast of Saint John of the Ladder

+ Metropolitan Germanos of Elis”

 

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A truly wise and humble Hierarch, who had an Orthodox conscience, an ecclesiastic mindset and an ecclesiastic ethos. I remember him with a particular sentiment and respect, as one of the great olden Hierarchs of our Church, graced with seriousness and decorum!

Eternal be the memory of the blessed Metropolitan Germanos - the traditional, methodical, inoffensive and theologian Hierarch. May God rank him among the righteous.

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That text follows below, without the references.

 The "Ontology of the Person" in contemporary theology

by Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos and Saint Vlasios

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As an introduction, I would like to highlight a crucial point: that the Fathers of the Church had already expounded on the topic of “person” in reference to God, when confronting the ancient heretics of the 3rd and 4th centuries: Paul of Samosata, Lucian, Arius, Sabellius, Nestorius, e.a., who spoke of God  “Aristotelianly” or philosophically.

Students of Patristic texts are familiar with the phrase by Saint Gregory the Theologian: that the Fathers spoke "piscatorially, but not Aristotelianly”; that is, they spoke from within God’s revelation-manifestation, and not in any philosophical manner. Thus, they spoke of “Person” in reference to God, and of man as “created according to the image and to the likeness of God” (=the Son) - and not of any “ontology of the person.” Those who speak of “ontology of the person” do so “Aristotelianly” and not “piscatorially”. The word “ontology” is the term that pertains to the being (GR: όν – όντος), and it clearly points to the philosophy of Plato, mainly that of Aristotle.

I honor the philosophy integrated in the “seminal word” of Saint Justin Martyr and Philosopher, because the ancient philosophers did speak of God, in their attempts to confront the childish concepts by idolaters on the 12-god “Pantheon”. From within this perspective, one can see the pre-Socratic philosophy: especially the two currents of Eleatic philosophy and the philosophy of Heracletus - as well as the later, classical metaphysics.

Therefore, it is prudent for one to be preoccupied with both ancient and contemporary philosophy; the problem, however, (and I have reservations on this) is when some contemporary theologians admix and confuse philosophy with Patristic theology, and strive to entwine them the way that the scholastic theologians and some contemporary theologians had done.

Following the above clarifications, I will briefly address the topic of  “the ontology of the person”.

 

1.        The teaching of the Fathers on God and man

When confronting the philosophizing theologians’ challenge of their time who ended up in heresy (such as Arius, Nestorius, Dioscorus, e.a.), the Fathers of the Church had used the terms “person”, “hypostasis”, “essence”, “nature” - but without accepting the philosophizers’ notions. Thus they concluded that the Triune God is three Persons-Hypostases, Who have Essence-Nature-Energy in common, but they did not accept these terms,  as used by the hereticizing theologians.

What applies is that which Saint Gregory Palamas wrote later: “If you examine, you will see that all or most of the terrible heresies have taken their principles from therein (=philosophy).” He also writes that - even when the Fathers use the same terms as the philosophers - they know how they differ from them: “Even if any one of the Fathers says the same things to outsiders, it is only in words; as for their meanings, they differ greatly;  for they (=the Fathers), according to Paul, have the mind of Christ, while they (=the philosophers), if not by something worse (i.e., influenced by the devil), speak out of human reasoning.”

Thus the Fathers of the Church - whereas initially speaking of  ‘the Fleshless and the Enfleshed Logos’, of ‘Father, Son and Holy Spirit’, of ‘three Lights’, of ‘the vision of the Light’, ‘through the Light’, ‘in the Light’ - they eventually also accepted the terms ‘person’, ‘hypostasis’, ‘essence’, ‘nature’, ‘energy’ - naturally with certain theological presuppositions.

In Orthodox hymnography, clearly seen is the parallel use of the terminology ‘Father, Son and Holy Spirit’ with ‘Light is the Father’, ‘Light is the Logos’, ‘Light is also the Holy Spirit’; of the ‘Fleshless’ and the ‘Enfleshed’ Logos - which is the terminology of the Prophets and the Apostles, but also the terminology of the later Fathers, such as: ‘three Persons-three Hypostases’, and ‘one essence-nature-energy’.

The Fathers of the Church do this because they know that the uncreated-ineffable words that God-seers can see invisibly, hear inaudibly and understand incomprehensibly are one thing, and the created words, meanings and images are another. The ineffable words are of the God-seeing experience, while the created words, meanings and images are expressions of experience. Therefore the charismatic experience through the uncreated Grace of God is the same in “theumens” (the deified), while that which is differentiated are the created words, meanings and images.

Saint Gregory the Theologian writes this very clearly: “To describe God – as if in my own words - is impossible; and to comprehend is even more impossible.”

Written by Saint Maximus the Confessor: “A pure mind sees things correctly. And an exercised word brings into view what was seen.”

And Saint John of Damascus writes: “It is therefore necessary - when wanting to speak or hear about God – to clearly know that not everything is ineffable, nor is everything explicit - both regarding the things of theology and the things of oikonomia (Providence) - nor is everything familiar or unfamiliar;  the familiar is one thing and the explicit is another, just as it is one thing to speak and another thing to know.  Therefore many things regarding God that are faintly comprehended cannot be opportunely expressed; so  we are obliged to speak of them according to what is familiar to us - just as we might say “sleep” and “wrath” and “negligence”, “hands” and “feet” and the suchlike, as if (they apply) in God.”

Saint John of Damascus refers here to theology and Oikonomia (Providence) and the difference between them, and that the ineffable are one thing and the explicit are another. Thus, many of the things about God that we understand vaguely cannot be expressed well.

The Fathers have said about the Triune God that He is three Persons, three Hypostases, but one nature-essence-energy common to all Three; but in parallel He is both one and three Lights, and that ineffable words of experience are one thing and created words, meanings and illustrations that formulate experience are another thing. This is very important for theology.

But the Fathers did not expound that “man is a person-hypostasis” (as it is with God), but “is created according to the image and to the likeness of the Logos”; just as they had also taught that there is no similarity between “uncreated” and “created”, and as such, no analogy can be made between the Triune God and man.

Indeed, if one reads the Cappadocian Fathers, especially Basil the Great, they will ascertain that those Fathers had established the terminology of Person and Essence as pertaining to God - that the Essence was common to the three Persons of the Holy Trinity - while ‘Person’-‘Hypostasis’ is each one’s hypostatic characteristic; that is, the Father’s hypostatic characteristic is that He is unbegotten; the Son’s is that He is begotten and the Holy Spirit’s is the “procession from”. However they did not transfer these terms to human beings.

When confronting Sabellius - who had said that God is One and has three disguises/masks - on the one hand, Basil the Great made the distinction between ‘Essence’ and ‘Person’, and on the other, had identified ‘Person’ with ‘Hypostasis’. Hence the Tri-une God has three Persons and one Essence. However, he did not say that man is a “person”; only that the common factor in humans is the essence, while what is particular to each one is the person (“personality”). Regarding man, he continues to characterize him as “according to the image and to the likeness of God”, by interpreting the relevant passage in Genesis: “let’s (=us,the Trinity)  make man according to our image and to our likeness”, and also  using many passages by the Apostle Paul and the Apostles, in which he makes reference to man being made according to the image and to the likeness of God. Indicative is the important diatribe by Olympia Tsanana-Papadopoulou on the anthropology by Basil the Great, which refers to this topic.

Later, Saint Maximus the Confessor transferred the Cappadocian terminology  of ‘essence’, ‘person’ and the terminology by Saint Cyril, of ‘natures’ and ‘hypostases-persons’ into Christology, in a different manner. That is, in the Triadic God there is one ‘essence-nature’ and three particular ‘persons-hypostases’, whereas in Christ there are two ‘essences-natures’ (divine and human) and one ‘hypostasis’. But he too did not transfer this Christological terminology into anthropology.  In his works, he analyzes that man is created according to the image and to the likeness of God:  the term ‘according to the image’ refers to the being and the eternally being, and ‘according to the likeness’ are benevolence and wisdom. That is why Saint Maximus writes: “While ‘according to the image’, all rational nature is of God, however, ‘according to the likeness’  is only of the good and the wise” – of course implying that they are according to God. Here also, we do not find expounded the concept of man as a person.

Then Saint John of Damascus, who had summarized all the teaching of the Fathers up to that time - even of the Ecumenical Councils - analyzes what ‘person’, ‘hypostasis’, ‘hypostatic’, ‘individual’ are, and in order to make them comprehensible, he uses examples from the created world. He writes: “for example: Peter, Paul, and that horse.” Peter, Paul, and the horse are used as examples for understanding the distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘person’ - without regarding the horse as a ‘person-hypostasis’ - as he simply wants to illustrate the distinction of one being from another (animate and inanimate), thus stating the existence of that being, and its difference from the other being. Thus, neither does Saint John of Damascus give any detailed analysis of man as a person-hypostasis.

For the sake of truth, it should be noted that when referring to man in his par excellence dogmatic text titled “Precise Exposition of the Orthodox Faith”, he links him to ‘according to the image and to the likeness of God’ - being comprised of soul and body – and is also the unity of all the world - the intellectual and the tactile.  He interprets ‘according to the Image’ as the noetic and the self-governing elements, and ‘according to the likeness’ as the similitude in virtue  - as much as is possible - that is, theosis (deification).

This is the reason he uses the passage by Saint Gregory the Theologian and characterizes man as “a creature here by providence - that is, here, in the present life - and transplaced elsewhere in the age to come; and after fulfilment of the mystery, deified by a gesture of God;  deified, by partaking of the divine luminance, and not transplaced into the divine essence.”

Nowhere in this text does he mention man as ‘person’ or  ‘hypostasis’. In fact, he writes that God created man as a sinless nature and a self-governing will. This means man did not have sin by nature “not having sinning in his nature”, but that sin could be committed by predisposition. In another of his texts, in the so-called ‘philosophical’ or ‘dialectic’ chapters, he analyzes various terms, such as ‘person’, ‘individual’, ‘incident’, but uses examples from man, as mentioned above.

 

2. Modern theologians on the “ontology of the person”

When modern theologians speak of ‘person’ in reference to God and man, they ignore - wittingly or unwittingly - the entire Patristic tradition on this subject and confuse the terms of the patristic tradition with the terms used by contemporary philosophy. In reality, they are referring to the ontology and not the theology of the person.

The term ‘ontology’, borrowed from classical metaphysics, is a term of metaphysics and not of theology. ‘Theology’ is discourse about the God of revelation as found in the Prophets, the Apostles and the Fathers, while ‘ontology’ is a discourse about the being, as expressed by classic and contemporary metaphysical philosophers. I think this clarification of the terms must be made, because “the beginning of wisdom is the visitation of names”, according to the wise Antisthenes.

The difference between contemporary theologians who speak of ‘person’ in God and man is evident in several phrases that I will define further along.  However, I must previously make a necessary clarification. There is no similarity between the uncreated God and created Creation -including man- just as there is a vast difference between theology (speaking of God) and Oikonomia (speaking of the creation of the world) and the Incarnation of the Son and Logos of God.  Likewise, the external relations of God with His Creation (His ‘energies’) are one thing,  and the internal relations in the Triune God (hypostatic characteristics) are another thing, while the innermost characteristics of the Triune God (‘essence’) are another thing altogether.

Unfortunately there are some who – by using created images and realities, and even with the use of logic – are just “strolling through” the Holy Trinity, as Fr. John Romanides characteristically used to say.

Saint Gregory Palamas has expressed this emphatically: “Hyper-unknown and hyper-ineffable are all the things that pertain both to the ‘essential’ union and to the hypostatic discernment, as well as to the unmixed and unmingled coexistence in every way; that is, of Their communion. They are thus, because they are also entirely un-partakeable.” That is, since the things pertaining to the ‘essence’  and the ‘hypostatic distinctions’ are not partakeable (by humans), they are completely hyper-ineffable.

And he continues: “For this reason, no example of these can be found  in Creation”. That is, no-one can find any example of these things in nature. Whatever takes place within the Triune God has not example of it in nature.

We cannot say anything about the ‘essence’, which is why “the sequence and distinction of the hypostases is unfathomable to everyone, as being beyond the boundaries here.” That is, it is impossible to comprehend the entirely incomprehensible sequence and distinction of the hypostases. Then, when referring to the names ‘father’ and ‘son’ in human things, he writes that there are no analogies between God and human things, even if the same words are used; that is, the distinction between apophatism and cataphatism cannot be discontinued. Saint Gregory writes: “There is a Father and a Son in us also; they too are of one essence, but are not inseperable between them, nor are they within each other”, which means that in us humans there are also a father and a son, who have the same essence, but they are not inseparable from each other, nor are they within one another, as is the case in the Triune God.

Following the above, it made me think: how do contemporary theologians draw analogies between the Uncreated and the created, between the Triune God and humans, given that analogy between God and man is strictly forbidden? Vladimir Lossky wrote that he did not find any Patristic teaching expounding on the human ‘person’. Saint Gregory Palamas juxtaposes the Orthodox hesychastic tradition towards the “contemplative analogy”.

We will therefore examine three specific points, in which is evident the modern view on the “ontology of the person”, that has clearly originated from scholasticism - that meta-patristic theology - and had even reached German idealism and Russian theology of the 19th and 20th centuries, to eventually pass into the theology of contemporary theologians.

a) Nature and necessity, person and volition-will 

One encounters among modern personalist theologians the view that nature is linked to necessity, and by extension to sin, and that volition is linked to the person. However, it firstly seems paradoxical how they relate nature with necessity and sin, given that nature as regards humans was created “very good” by God.

The view that nature is linked to necessity is of Aristotelian origin and was used by Arius and the Arians for the purpose of characterizing the Son as a creation.

In following Aristotelian philosophy, as did the theologians who preceded him (Paul of Samosata, Lucian), Arius theorized that everything originating from nature is compulsory - that it originates out of necessity. So they related the essence to necessity, and by extension asserted that everything originating from the essence is compulsory – which is why the Son is a willed creation of God and as such is subsequently a creation. To avoid the compulsory begetting of the Son by the Father, Arius arrived at the willed creation of the Son by the Father.  And that is how the Arians were the first to relate nature to necessity and volition to ‘person’.

Athanasius the Great, who was the first to tackle this serious problem, had made insightful observations.

First of all, he began from a different perspective; that is, he did not philosophize based on Aristotelian philosophy; instead, based on the teaching of the Prophets and the Apostles - to whom the Unfleshed and Enfleshed Logos had revealed Himself.  In his works, both “On the Incarnation of the Logos,” which had been written prior to Arius’ heresy (but obviously keeping in mind the overall philosophical perspective of the philosophizing theologians of his time), and also in his works “Against Arians”, he had used passages from both the Old and the New Testament to support the divinity of the Logos.

It is clearly evident that in the early ecclesiastic life there were two theologizing trends: the one was that of the philosophizing theologians, and the other of the empirical-charismatic theologians, who were the Fathers of the Church.

Later on, Athanasius the Great wrote that the Fathers of the Church do not accept that what is by nature is out of necessity, because then, God would have been benevolent, “not wanting to”. “By nature” does not necessarily denote “out of necessity” - just as luminosity (the brightness) of light is not out of necessity, but is so by nature.

He furthermore made the clear distinction between nature and volition-will. God the Father by nature begets the Son and sends out/forth the Holy Spirit; and the Triune God (Who is eternal) created all of Creation by willing it. The pre-eternal begetting of the Son through His nature is one thing, and the in-Time creation of the cosmos by the Triune God willing-wanting it, is another.

He further emphasized that the will of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is one; that is, the volition-will of the Father is not one thing, while the volition-will of the Son and the Holy Spirit are another. The Son is the “living volition-will of the Father, and the volition-will of the Father is in Him.”

Therefore, what Arius had asserted does not apply:  i.e., that the Son is a creation of the Father’s volition-will; He is “a living volition-will, and truly begotten by nature – like the effulgence of light.” He ended by writing that the Father does not will the begetting of the Son, nor does He will anything for Himself. It is sheer madness for one to believe that “will and thought” interpolate between the Father and the Son.

It therefore becomes evident that the modern personalists (who link nature to necessity and the volition-will to the person) are continuing Arius’ heresy and opposing Athanasius the Great and all the Fathers of the Church. This is a meta-patristic theology that constitutes a heresy, because it was condemned by the First Ecumenical Council. They are obviously not theologizing orthodoxically, but are following modern philosophy.

It should be duly noted that the view of nature being linked to necessity and the will-volition to the person is the central position of modern philosophy, but also of contemporary Western theology. This was developed particularly in German idealism and Western existentialism. These currents have also influenced contemporary Roman Catholic theologians, such as Rahner, Romano Guardini, Protestant theologians such as Karl Warth, and even Russian Orthodox theologians, such as Khomyakov, and Russian philosophers, such as Berdyaev who was influenced by the mystic Jacob Boehme.

I would like to refer in particular to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant which expresses German idealism and has greatly influenced contemporary Orthodox theologians. An analysis of the topic of ‘person’ in Kant was made by Professor Georgios Panagopoulos.

According to Kant, as evidenced in his “Critique of Practical Reason”,“personality identifies with freedom, independently of the entire mechanism of Nature”. He “is the first to see man as a person, that is, as a free being, in his absolute worth.” According to Kant, “the free will of the subject (personality) is the sole source of self-legitimization, that is, of autonomy.”

Kant, “with the concept of autonomy enters the realm of freedom” - which characterizes the person. It (autonomy) is a “transcendentalist freedom” that is linked to the person, and freedom itself  “he juxtaposes to the mechanism of nature.” This “transcendentalist freedom” must be understood only “as independence from everything experiential, and as such, from nature in general.”

From Kant, who discovered the human person as something of absolute worth, we arrive at Schelling, who recognized God as the absolutely free personality.

Then, when speaking of ‘Sein and Dasein’, Heidegger speaks of the person as having three characteristics, namely "abandonment" (since man understands he has been “dumped” into this world); "ecstasis" (which is the exit from himself and his communication with others), and "presentness" (inasmuch as he understands there are other beings who are next to him and are also governed by death).

These all signify that other, Greek Orthodox personalist theologians have been influenced by Kant's theories about the person as a transcendental principle and its autonomy from necessity and the mechanism of nature, as well as the voluntarism that resulted in Nietzsche's ubermensch as the hyper-worth of man, while others have been influenced by Heidegger regarding the ‘person’ with the characteristic features of abandonment, ecstasy and presentness.

It seems, therefore, that among neo-Orthodox Greek theologians there is a discussion and conflict between Kantian philosophy and Heideggerian philosophy regarding the ‘person’, with influences and reactions from scholastic, neo-scholastic theologians, existential philosophers and Russian theologians - and it is done by overlooking the Orthodox Tradition.

To express this more accurately, I am noting that by having in mind all these central views of German idealism in relation to modern existentialism, and in order to to support the individual theories of those philosophers, the Greek Orthodox personalists also quote certain fragmentary passages by the Fathers of the Church – thus ignoring the full content of those Fathers, who did not link nature to necessity, nor the volition-will-freedom to the ‘person’.

 

This is a ‘chimerical’ theology. Just as the Chimera was a hybrid animal that lived in ancient Lycia: a mythical, three-morph monster which had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent (the monster that Homer mentions in his “Iliad” and Hesiod in his “Theogony”), modern theologians similarly strive to link modern Western philosophy with Western theology and the Orthodox theology of the Church Fathers.  This in actual fact is a Chimera.

Those who hold such views do not agree with the teaching of the Fathers - of the Church Herself - that the will-volition is natural (that it is of nature and not of the ‘person’) – and that predisposition in humans differs from volition-will. They thus arrive at volitional (voluntaristic) personalism, which contains the seeds of Arianism. It is for this reason, that the discourse on volition-will and predisposition - regarding the natural and the gnomic (opinioned) will - is important and opportune.

Volition-will is a central theme in Christology and anthropology. The Fathers of the Church had addressed this issue in Christology and from there had extended it into anthropology. Given that several heretical monophysites and monothelites had sprung forth maintaining that Christ has only one nature, and also that (albeit having two natures), He nevertheless has one will - the will of the ‘Person’;  it was for this reason that the Fathers had dogmatized Christ as having two natures and two energies (divine and human) in His one hypostasis - the hypostasis of the Logos. The will (volition) is a characteristic of nature, which is why Christ, Who had two natures, also had two wills – divine and human – in one person-hypostasis.

In order for the Fathers of the Church to substantiate this theological truth, they made analyses of what volition-will is, and whether it is a characteristic of nature or of the ‘person’.

This was resolved by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which ruled that volition-will is not hypostatic, which means that it is not linked to the hypostasis, but is natural. If it were linked to ‘person’, then Christ would have had only one will – and as such, monothelitism (“single-willed”) is justified. This is the trap and heresy that those who speak of the volition-will and the freedom of the ‘person’ necessarily fall into.

b) Communion of persons

The phrase “communion of persons” is used a lot today by personalists. This is a phrase that originates from modern philosophy and states that man is a person and as such, his relationships must be personal. This phrase “communion of persons” is also used for the relations between the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. However, this phrase is not found anywhere in patristic theology, and I will explain why.

There are three manners of union: in essence (which takes place with the three Persons of the Holy Trinity); the in hypostasis union of the two natures (which took place in the hypostasis of the Logos, after the Incarnation), and in energy (which is the union of God with man).

This signifies that  the phrase “communion of persons” does not apply to any of the aforementioned three unions, which is why such an expression distorts Orthodox theology, and is ill-referenced by many theologians and non-theologians in our day.

First of all, the phrase “communion of persons” does not even exist in the Triune God, given that the relationship of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is by essence and by nature. There is an “accommodation” between the Persons, a “co-dwelling” of the three Persons; there is a communion of essence and of energy, but not of hypostatic characteristics. In the Triune God there are the in-common and the not-in-common things;  that is, ‘essence’ and ‘energy’ are common to all three, while their manners of existence are not-in-common.  

The three Persons of the Holy Trinity have the same essence and the same energy, but particular hypostatic characteristics, inasmuch as the hypostatic characteristic of the Father is that He is unbegotten, of the Son is that He is begotten, and of the Holy Spirit, Who is emanated (sent forth). There can be no confusion regarding the hypostatic characteristics in the Persons of the Holy Trinity.

Thus, in the Triune God there exists the communion of nature, and not a communion of Persons. The Father’s essence is communed to the Son through begetting, and His essence is communed to the Holy Spirit through emanation (“sending forth”).

The in-common and the not-in-common elements in the Persons of the Holy Trinity rule out the existence of a “communion of Persons” in the Triune God (given that such a view disregards what is not-in-common); but nature and energy are in-common. When some assert that there is a “communion of Persons” in the Triune God, then they are essentially assuming that there are no not-in-common hypostatic characteristics in God, consequently causing confusion regarding the hypostatic characteristics of unbegottenness, begottenness and emanation. This is both blasphemous and a cacodoxy.

Subsequently, if in the Triune God the hypostatic characteristics are not-in-common, we cannot speak of a “communion of Persons” in the Triune God - only of a “communion of nature”.

The unity between the Persons of the Holy Trinity is attributed to (a) the monarchy (sole principal) of the Father, Who begets the Son and Who emanates the Holy Spirit, and (b) to their common nature-essence and energy.

Saint John of Damascus speaks of the triune hypostases as being “undistanced” - as not distancing themselves from one another - that they “are non-departing, having an unconfused between them “accommodation”, so that they are neither con-joined nor con-fused, but that they just ‘are’ with each other.”

There is unity between the three hypostases and an unconfused ‘inter-accomodating’, due to their common nature and essence, but also due to the fact that the Son is begotten of the Father before all the ages, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is sent by the Son before all the ages, but without there being any kind of “communion of persons.”

Nevertheless, the Fathers do speak of a “communion of nature” and of “mutual indwelling and accommodation” between the Persons of the Holy Trinity, without, however, any co-elimination or admixing of heterogeneous elements, or any confusion. Thus, the Son is “in” the Father and “in” the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit is “in” the Father and “in” the Son, and the Father is “in” the Son and “in” the Spirit - “without any conjoining or admixing or confusion taking place”.

However, in God there is “one and the same thing in movement” (that is, in His energy): one is the “outward leap”, that is, a surge, and one is the movement of the three divine hypostases “which is considered impossible in created nature”. What happens in the Triune God cannot happen in created nature. And that divine radiance and energy - albeit one, simple and unpartitioned thing, “and varying benevolently among divisible things, it distributes components of its own nature while remaining simple; although proliferating indivisibly among divisible things, it  collects the distributed things and returns to its own simplicity.”

Subsequently in the Triune God there is no “community of Persons,” but rather a mutual indwelling and an unconfused mutual accommodation of the Persons, since in the divine hypostases there are both in-common things and not-in-common things. Therefore, when the phrase “community of Persons” is used for God, the difference between the hypostatic characteristics is eliminated and confusion is created in the Trinitarian doctrine.

Besides, “communion of Persons” does not exist in the God-man Christ, since in Him, no two persons were united (God and man); only His two natures (divine and human) were united in one hypostasis;  likewise,  the Logos is the hypostasis of human nature. Therefore, we cannot speak of a “communion of Persons” in the God-man Christ; only of the “hypostatic union” of His two natures.

Furthermore, “communion of Persons” does not exist in man. Man’s relationship with God, as mentioned earlier, is with His energy and not His essence and His hypostasis. Man communes with God’s essence-making, life-making, wisdom-making and deifying energies. When a deified man “sees” God, he is partaking of His deifying energy. The three Disciples atop Mount Tabor had partaken of the deifying energy of God, “in the Person” of Jesus Christ. In all the patristic texts, mention is made of God’s uncreated energy, with which man communes. The God-seer partakes of God’s glory.

But even at a human level, we cannot speak of a “community of persons,” because, given that there is no “community of Persons” in the Triune God, much less can there be a “community of persons” in man.

Of course there can be love between people, but that cannot be understood as a “community of persons” nor as a mutual indwelling of persons, as it is an emotional or even a spiritual love - which takes place “in Christ” but is nevertheless susceptible to various alterations, due to corporal and soulish passions.

Therefore, we cannot use the phrase “community of persons” - not for God, not for the God-man Christ, nor for people. I think this phrase “community of persons” should be eliminated altogether from our theological vocabulary.

Dogmatics Professor Vasilios Tsigos, has written a wonderful book on perichoresis (“adjacently accommodating”), in which he argues that the term perichoresis is the one used by the Fathers for the relationship between the Persons of the Holy Trinity, for the two natures in Christ and for the union of man with God.

c) “Individual” and “person”

The distinction between “individual” and “person” is widely used today by personalists, after having influenced all of us in the past. It is a view that is welcomed by modern audiences, however, from a patristic point of view it is unacceptable, since according to the Fathers, “individual” identifies with “person”.

The Fathers of the Church, when speaking of the Triune God, identified the concepts of ‘hypostasis’, ‘person’ and ‘individual’. For example, Saint John of Damascus writes: “It is necessary to know that the holy Fathers had called hypostasis and person and individual as one and the same thing.” This means ‘hypostasis’, ‘person’ and ‘individual’ state the same thing, and are inherently self-contained, consisting  of essence and manner of existence (namely: unbegotten, begotten, and emanated).

Besides, “in-dividual” as a word means “non-divisible” and subsequently in the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, the essence is not separate from their hypostatic characteristics, just as in Christ, His divine nature is not separated from His human nature.

At any rate, in the Triune God it is not possible to make a distinction between ‘person’ and ‘individual’, while attributing love, freedom, and the eternity of existence to the ‘person’, while “individual” is simply added alongside them. If such a distinction were used for God, it would constitute indecency, disrespect.

The fact is that the Fathers of the Church persevere in one consistency for man: that man is made “according to the image and to the likeness of God”; that with the fall of the first-fashioned humans we lost the likeness but not the image, and that through Christ we are led from the image to the likeness, to theosis (deification). In the works of the Fathers there is no reference to man as ‘person’, as ‘individual’, as ‘personality’ and ‘individuality’. Such a view is a post-Patristic theology.

The interpreting of man from within the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘individual’ originates from Western theology, philosophy, sociology and ethics. The theories of personalism are well known. Saint Augustine (354-430 AD) related ‘person’ to the psychological characteristics of man; that is, he linked he term ‘person’ to the capability of conscience - which led the West to psychoanalysis. Boethius (480-524 AD) linked ‘individual’ to its capability of rationalizing, as can be seen in the definition that “Person is the individual essence of rational nature”. This view passed through scholasticism and the Enlightenment to modern personalism and even to existentialism.

The theory of man as ‘person’ in the concept of love, freedom and the eternal uniqueness of existence seems seductive and provokes modern man, but it carries many risks by undermining the theology of the Church. If such a perception prevails, then love and freedom will be linked to ‘person’ – in which case, each Person of the Holy Trinity will have a particular love and freedom, and furthermore, the Uncreated will relate to the created, triadology will be confused with anthropology and situations that occur in humans will be attributed to God, the will (volition) will be disconnected from nature - and much more. This constitutes an alienation of the theological word.

These indicative expressions (nature and necessity, volition-will and person, communion of persons, individual and person) all point to the diverging of modern theology from patristic theology.

 

3.The consequences of personalism in ecclesiastic life

Something very important and noteworthy must be pointed out, which has to do with the so-called meta-patristic theology on the freedom of the person.

The transfer of the specific personalistic triadological view into today's Christian anthropology with the legendary "freedom of the person" - which is in fact presented as an essential characteristic of the Orthodox East compared to the essentialism of the Christian West - has specific extensions, such as the frequent criticism of Orthodox asceticism as opposing the "freedom of the person".

A few of the specific misrepresentations of ecclesiastic life by those who speak of the so-called “freedom of volition-will”, and “freedom of the person” will now be highlighted.

Firstly, the ecclesiastic order of things is interpreted and perceived from within the theory of freedom of the person and of love – the way that they were interpreted by Alexei Khomyakov and Afanasiev.  According to these theories, the experiencing of freedom and love is of great importance in ecclesiastic life, regardless of the canonical prerequisites established by the Fathers of the Local and Ecumenical Councils. Thus, ecclesiastic life is judged in practice with “bourgeois democracy” terms, in order to target hierarchical structures of the Church and  judge them as oppressive and inconsistent with the first “allegedly democratic” ancient Church. This erroneous dogmatic position is then used at the level of theology, in order to introduce various humanist and Protestant views on the partaking of the charisms of the Holy Spirit, independently of the theological and canonical prerequisites, as if spiritual life were a “bourgeois type of democracy”, in which everyone enjoys the gifts of the Holy Spirit - without prerequisites.

Secondly, the asceticism of hesychasm is judged as reflecting the logic of individualist salvation, which has no direct reference to the “ontology of the person” - that is, “to exist freely in a relationship” – but rather to the perspective of an individualist catharsis (cleansing) of passion - with no reference to the other human, who constitutes the precondition of “existing personally”.

Thirdly, ecclesiastic and ascetic piety, which is praised by the ascetic Fathers, is criticized by the exponents of the “freedom of the person” theory as an unfree Western pietism and moralism, but also as a “religionizing of the ecclesiastic experience”. Thus, the phenomenon of judging and undermining the content of the “Philokalia of the Holy Neptic Fathers” is observed: that it supposedly constitutes a “therapeutic ecclesiology”, which had overturned the “eucharistic ecclesiology” of the early Church!

Fourthly, obedience to a spiritual father is judged as a curtailing of the “freedom of the person” and the discarding of responsibility for their existence (for “existing freely”) by the very confessee,  and the relegating of that “personal responsibility” onto an Elder.  Of course we do not overlook various mistakes that are made in this area, whether by spiritual fathers or by spiritual children, but it is not possible for such errors to undermine the course of man from slavery to the freedom of the children of God, as described in the course of the Israelite people from Egypt to the Promised Land - with the God-seeing guidance of Moses.

Subsequently, the erroneous theory about the “freedom of the will-volition” and the “freedom of the person” and about the link of the will to the person, has significant implications in the ecclesiastic sphere. Such theories undermine the life of the Church and the conditions of sanctification, and essentially misinterpret Saint Maximus the Confessor himself, who speaks of a “practical philosophy”, “natural theory” and “mystical theology”, as well as all the holy Fathers who speak of catharsis-purification, illumination and theosis-deification.

 

General conclusion

The general conclusion is that the Fathers of the Church from the 4th century onwards spoke of God as three Persons (who have the same essence-nature) in order to confront the heretics who philosophized Aristotelianly, however they did not transfer all this theology onto man, whom they said was created “according to the image and to the likeness of God”.

Contemporary theologians speak of the “ontology of the person” using contemporary philosophy which links nature to necessity and the will-volition to the person. Such a view, however, overturns all the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils, which opine that will-volition is an appetite of nature and not of the person.

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